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HYPERVELOCITY IMPACT STUDY CONSULTING
FOREWORD
A portion of the contract NAS8-38856, "Structural Damage Prediction and
Analysis for Hypervelocity Impacts," from NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), included consulting which was to be documented in the final report.
This attachment to the final report contains memos produced as part of that
consulting. The Technical Monitors were Joel Williamsen, Greg Olsen, and
Jennifer Robinson. Consulting was performed between October, 1990 and
September, 1995.
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Subject: Critical Flaw Size in a 2219-T87 Tank Date: October 3, 1990
Given Conditions:
Geometry: ..... Cylinder
Diameter ...... 50 inches
Thickness ..... 0.175 inches
Length ......... 60 inches
Analysis Results
Material ......... 2219-T87
Pressure ......... 313 psi
Stress Level ..... 44.7 ksi
Temperature...Ambient
Geometry
-FLAGRO Solution Number
Surface Crack in a Flat Plate
12 inches Wide -SC01
External Surface Crack in a
Pipe Longitudinal - SC03
Through Crack in Pipe
Longitudinal - TC07
Through Crack in Pipe
Longitudinal - TC07
Through Crack in Pipe
Longitudinal - TC07
This is the recommended case.
Diameter
[in]
Infinite
50
Toughness
Kc [ksi.4in]
3O
3O
Critical
Flaw [in]
a = 0.15
2c = 0.30
a =0.14
2c = 0.28
25 54.3 2a = 0.77
thru
50 30
50 54_
2a = 0.28
thru
Za = 0.82
thru
Notes:
Through flaw length - 2a
Surface Flaws were assumed to be semi-circular.
a = depth 2c = total length at the surface
CRITICAL FLAW SIZE CALCULATIONS - NASA/FLAGRO compiled on a
Macintosh was used for all calculations. (See attachments.) However, the
surface flaw solutions were modified by Martin Marietta Manned Space
Systems to give the critical flaw size when the stress intensity at either the
depth, a, or the surface, c, exceed the toughness. The original FLAGRO
program calculated the critical flaw size based on only the depth. The
page 1
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modified program will give a smaller flaw size for those situations when
the stress intensity is higher at the surface. This is not a very significant
effect for semi-circular flaws in pure tension.
TOUGHNESS - The toughness of 54.3 ksi was calculated by FLAGRO for the
thickness of the cylinder. This is consistent with experimental
observations. (See Attachments for representative flaws that fail at similar
stresses, eg. for thickness = 0.188 [all dimensions in inches], width = 3.91,
and an initial flaw size ofa = 0.118 and 2c = 0.714 the fracture stress was
48.5 ksi.) Reducing Kc to 30 ksi_/in for impact conditions is not
recommended for 2219-T87. Hopkinson bar tensile tests on 2219-T87 show
that both the strength and ductility increase at high strain rates. High
strain rate behavior often correlates with cryogenic behavior. Cryogenically
2219-T87 has higher strength, ductility and toughness than at room
temperature. (This is not true for all aluminum alloys.) The material is
therefore expected to be tougher under impact than under static conditions.
CRITICAL IMPACT - If the higher toughness is correct as recommended,
then this implies it is possible to leak without rupture. Impact craters
which do not exceed the thickness may still cause a penetration by spalling
the remaining thickness. (A rough approximation for a leak threshold is a
crater depth of 70 percent through the thickness.) However, if the impact
crater depth exceeds the thickness of the pressure wall, significant energy
will be deposited in the contents. If an incompressible fluid is present on
the other side of the wall, high pressures will cause the wall to tear. A
conservative assumption is that cracks will run to the critical length and
then propogate due to internal pressure. On the other hand, if a
compressible vapor is present, then a hole even larger than the critical flaw
size may be acceptable. However, for a hole that size, failure of the opposite
wall may be the more likely failure mechanism.
Analyst: _/_/_0/r'- _C_
Norman Elfer Pb]_.
Program Manager
Hypervelocity Impacts Study
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2:54 PM 2/11/91
A Preliminary and Informal Analysis of Meteoroid/Debris CR Impacts
Reference: Meteoroid/Debris Change Requests 869A and 883A
Question 1: Will subject designs meet projected ballistic limit curves ?
The curves appear to meet the ballistic limit equations proposed by Eric
Christiansen. (Selected points were checked. A complete check is in
progress.)
The total areal density and spacing for the BL curves given is consistent with
results achieved by multi-shock (MS) shields, but I suspect that more
refinement of the MS shield will be required to achieve these BL curves at such
large debris sizes. (Refinements/optimization include number of layers,
spacing, mass distribution within layers, etc.) This could influence attach
structure complexity and weight, but this would be a less significant effect.
Question 2: Will curves used result in probabilities projected?
• This was not checked yet, but the analysis is presumed correct.
Did the analysis consider variations in pitch atitude?
A pitch of +30 ° to +36 ° when the Shuttle is attached (assumed to be 10% of
the time) could severely decrease the PNP.
Question 3: Are there better ways to perform the design ?
The NEXTEL MS shield has the lowest areal density of any shield system for
direct impact of aluminum projectiles in the 1 cm size range. However, it also
has the largest spacing requirements.
A bumper designed to cause "ricochet" may be an alternative to the MS shield.
Increased secondary debris flux could be a hazard. The shield sizing will be
analyzed in more detail.
Collision avoidance (CA) should be used and accounted for in the analysis.
The attached figure shows the effect of CA on the flux of debris. The figure
assumes 100% avoidance of 10 cm and larger debris. For the same flux level
(Probability of No Impact) the debris diameter can be reduced from 4 to 2
centimeters in diameter. A more detailed analysis on the overall PNP is
possible. It can include variables in debris detection, Probability of No Failure
of the CA system, etc.
The module wall and shield design should be changed to prevent Crit. A
failures.
The module wall waffle (integrally machined stiffener) spacing should be
reduced to prevent either a hole which could cause too rapid de-pressur-
ization, or a crack which could cause catastrophic rupture. A 7 inch
spacing would probably be adequate, but a 5.25 inch spacing would almost
HVIS Consulting - page 5
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certainly prevent a Crit A failure. (It is assumed that a 6 inch diameter
hole is the limit for de-pressurization. This analysis depends on
operations, final design, ECLSS, etc. and should be provided by BAC.)
Additional stringers could add significant weight to the module. To
maintain the same weight, the additional crack stopper stiffeners could be
limited to a height of 0.75 inches and the rear wall reduced in thickness to
0.105 inches. A larger shield spacing, and ballistic blankets would more
than make up for the loss in rear wall thickness. The required thickness
and height of the crack stopping stiffeners has not been calculated yet. This
is based on ROM estimates of the effects of stiffeners on the stress intensity
in a cylinder. Detailed NASTRAN analyses will be conducted for the
Handbook.
If a deployable or erectable shield must be used, then the standoff should be
so large as to prevent momentum/Wilkinson failure. The NEXTEL MS
system described by Christiansen reportedly will exhibit momentum failure
above 6 km/s. Even though large standoffs are used, the low areal density of
each shield does not spread the debris over a large area. The spay area on
the rear wall is so small that bulging and tearing can occur. Extrapolation
above 7 km/s is not very clear if larger spacings are used. Hydrocodes are
limited by the large spacings and lack of good material models for cloth. As
a conservative estimate, the BL for fragment penetration should be kept
constant above a normal impact velocity of 6 km/s.
It is suggested that the minimum spacing should be twice the spacing
which causes rupture at approximately 7 km/s. This would provide
protection from momentum rupture due to a particle twice as massive and
twice as fast as can be tested with current two stage light gas gun
technology. Larger particles would not be fully shattered by the bumper
system and would not deposit their full momentum in the rear wall.
The effect of obliquity on momentum failure is not well documented. A
conservative approach has been to use only the normal component of
momentum (Wilkinson and Cour-Palais/Crews/Christiansen). The
equations should be modified to account for larger effective spacing for
oblique impacts.
Further analysis is in progress for inclusion in the Handbook.
A complete design incorporating all of these features is not available at this
time.
Norman Elf r__
Hypervelocity Impacts Study
Program Manager(so )
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Structural Damage Prediction and Analysis tor Hypervelocity Impacts
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[Impacts
/y/m^2]
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0.00000001
1E-10
0.001
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MARTIN MARIETTA MANNED SPACE SYSTEMS
Date:
To:
From:
Subject:
April 30, 1993
G. Olsen NASA-MSFC ED52
C. Finnegan NASA-MSFC ED24
J. Newman NASAoLaRC 188E
R. Forman NASA-JSC ES5
H. Neid GE CR&D
W. Bachrach GE CR&D
D. Williams Boeing Huntsville
N. Elfer
Fracture Toughness of 2219-T87
Attachment: a)
References: 1)
PO BOX 29304
NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA 70189
4150-HVIS-93-1
Boeing Process Specification Departure PSD 5-1 to Process
Specification BAC 5602, dated 2/13/63
b) Boeing Process Specification Departure PSD 5-1 coordination sheet
from Bob Sands, dated 2/12/1963, describing the rationale for BAC
5602 PSD 5-1.
c) Boeing direction to a vendor dated 2/11/63, describing the before
and after condition in BAC 5602 PSD 5-1.
d) Memo dated 2/11/74 from Bob Gerdetz, ALCOA, to Pete Hinkeldey,
Martin Marietta (proprietary pages on capability withheld)
"Damage Tolerant Design Handbook," J. P. Gallagher, ed. Battelle
Metals and Ceramics Information Center MCICHB-01R, 1986.
2) Eichenberger, T. W.: "Fracture Resistance Data Summary,"
Report DA-20947, 1962. (as referenced in reference 1)
3) Elfer, N.: "Fracture Toughness Comparison," Martin Marietta
Manned Space Systems, IRAD M-01S, 826-2370, 1987
The fracture toughness of 2219-T87 has come into question in the damage tolerance
analysis of Space Station Freedom modules. In particular there was a significant
difference in the plane stress fracture toughness (Kc) quoted in References 1 (derived
from data in ref. 2 which was published in 1962) and the plane stress fracture
toughness quoted in References 3 from 1987. The 1962 data indicated a K¢ of
approximately 100 ksi_]in based on an initial total flaw size (2c) of eight inches in 0.1
inch thick sheet. There was also a flaw size dependence typical of R-curve effects, such
that shorter flaws had lower toughness and larger flaws showed an even higher
fracture toughness. In contrast, the 1987 data showed only a 65 ksiqin I_ based on
initial flaw lengths (2c) of four to 10 inches in 0.125 inch sheet. There have been
suggestions that this difference may be due to test method. This letter notes there was a
difference in heat treatment between the two sets of specimens, and that may outweigh
any differences in the test procedure.
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It was first thought that the difference in toughness was due to differences in anti-
buckling restraints used during testing. Reference 1 notes the existence of anti-
buckling restraints in the 1962 test report, but it does not detail the fixturing used. It
has been postulated that the anti-buckling restraint consisted of plates on either side of
the specimen, with a machined slot to observe the crack, very close to the crack tip. In
the 1987 test program, C-channel sections were used on both sides of the specimen, one
to two inches above and below the crack plane. Polyethylene pads, 0.25 inch thick, were
placed between the C-channels and the specimen. Don McCabe at Oak Ridge National
Lab, chairman of the ASTM sub-committee on R-curve testing, was contacted, and he
stated a strong preference for the latter (1987) method of anti-buckling restraints. He
felt the separate stiffeners were adequate to stop buckling, and would not risk picking
up some of the load.
Lacking details about the test program reported in 1962, it was also postulated that the
gage length between the grips/dogbones might not meet ASTM recommendations of 1.5
to 2 times the specimen width. However, finite element analysis has shown that a gage
length of 0.8 times the width would not have a significant effect (less than 5%) on
fracture toughness. Therefore, this could not explain the large disparity in reported
toughness.
If the test method is not responsible for the difference in toughness, then there should
be an explanation why the material was different between the two test programs. Old
Saturn files (attachments (a) through (c)) at the Michoud Assembly Facility showed
that the Boeing process specification for aging 2219-T37 to the -T87 condition changed in
1963 from 14 hours at 325°F to 24 hrs at 325°F + 10°F. The change in the heat treatment
was to ensure that there were no stress corrosion concerns. Stress corrosion of 2219
was known to be an issue in thick sections in the underaged condition, or peak aged
condition at low aging temperatures. It was also known that by aging 2219-T37 at 300°F
even better mechanical properties could be achieved, again at the expense of stress
corrosion susceptibility in thick sections.
The aging curves for 2219-T87 (Fig. 7 in attachment d) predict that there are no
significant differences in mechanical properties between aging 14 versus 24 hours at
325°F, but it can also be seen that ductility increases significantly at lower aging
temperatures, 300°F, or with shorter aging times. The specimens referenced in the
1962 report may have had an improved toughness associated with higher ductility from
either (1) aging at the low side of the 315 ° to 335°F temperature range, (2) purposefully
aging at 300°F, or (3) having material with slightly slower aging kinetics due to
chemistry or processing.
This strongly supports the current effort to test specimens that are heat treated using
the same procedures that will be used for SSF. The aging curves (attachment (d)) show
that ductility should not decrease using SSF's 375°F age forming temperature instead
of 325°F, but a slight reduction in tensile strength may occur, which would be reflected
inreducedtoughness. ;_7"_JQ-.._ __
IV. Elfer, Ph.D. I _'_ -
Material Sciences
Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems
PO Box 29304 Dept. 4150
New Orleans, LA 70189
Ph.:(504)257-3162 FAX:(504)257-4404
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COORDINATION SHEET
H. G. Anderson 5-4200 12-47 NO. 5-7512-M-3CS-I004
ITEM NO.
Materials and Processes Unit,
Standards and Specifications Group
Boeing _terial Specification BMS 7-I05B
(n) t_m_ 5_a?OO_M'lg. J_nu_nr 21: 1963,
DATE February 12,
MODEL SATURN
196_
(b) BA¢ 5602
The 2_ hour ago called out in BMS 7-I05E is a Vendor initiated heat treatment to improve the
stress corrosion resistance of 2219-T87 Aluminum. T_is aging treatment is, at the present
time! being coordinated for inclusion in MI-_A--8920 and M-I_----_.-6"0_-.
BAC _602 still calls _ut a 14 ho__a_E treatment for T-37 to T-8 Z material but since
_SAw_I! accept onlv24__h_ou_r__@aKed____t__erial_w__b@_Veissued P.S.D. _-i of DAC 5602 which
calls for a 24 hour a_e on sheet and plate for 2219-T_7 toT-_87 cond.
R- R. e_rLq
Anp ___1:_" ," ' 'r_lr : ,. ,"
I_, L. Koehler
cc" L. E. B11chart 5-7100 I_I-4]
w_ N_ n_l _r 5-7gPO _S-78
J
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ALUM NUM COMPANY OF At4!-R!CA
1309 WHITNEY BANK BUIi DING
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70130
R. L. GEi. bgT2, K--a'ch Sah.c, >lan_-.-e,'
ALCOA_
February 8, 1974
Mr. Peter Hinkeldey
Martin Marietta Corp.
P. O. Box 29304
New Orleans, Louisiana 70129
Dear Pete:
Attached is a copy of Paul Mehr's letter to me of 1/30/74
plus the other data which you have been requesting through
me.
i believe you can fully appreciate Paul's co_,ents with _e-
gard to the proprietary nature of our capabilities.
I plan to get together with you next week to discuss the
question in Paul's last paragraph.
Yours very truly,
R. L. Gerdetz
RLG :BBN
Attachment
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r;_: h ' .. ...... .. b
-.'_FROM -. PAUL L• MEHR r0 MR R L• GERDETZ
:z_ APPLICATION ENGINEERING DIVISION
: NEW KENSINGTON NEW ORLEANS
January 30, 1974
RE: MARTIN-MARIETTA AEROSPACE
v i
\.
_, :
Per L. W. Mayer's telegram of January 16, 1974, and your tele-
gram of January 16, 1974, enclosed herewith is the following
information:
, Four copies each of full range stress-strain curves for
22!9-T81 and T87 sheet, and 2219-T351, T37, T851 and T87
plate
2. Aging curves for 2219 material as follows:
Natural aging of 0.064" thick 2219-T42 sheet
Natural aging of 0.064" thick 2219-T37 sheet
Artificial aging of 2219-T42 sheet and T4 forgings
Artificial aging of 2219-T31 products
Artificial aging of 2219-T37 products
Artificial aging of 2219 sheet, cold worked 20% after
quenching
Effect of cold work on strengths of 2219 artificially
aged at 375_F
:!
i
We had also promised Pete Hinkeldey that we would provide gen-
eral guidelines on Alcoa plate stretching capabilities. Enclosed
herewith are these general guidelines which have been provided
by Mr. H. W. Green based on current data supplied by Davenport•
You will note that we consider this information to be proprietary
and would request that Mr. Hinkeldey treat this information
as such.
I would also be interested in the current status of the Space
Shuttle External Tank program at Martin Marietta. Is there
any additional information that is required? Has Martin Marietta
established the basic External Tank design; and if so, we would
appreciate reviewing the various components to make sure that
everything is within Alcoa's current capabilities.
i
PAUL L. _IEHR RECEIv£:D 2
PL._! : j p A LCOA _ b,'iw o_, L[_NS :_i,.
cc : ATC-TID ......
L. W. Mayer, Pittsburgh 27 - '.
J. A. Schroeder, Pittsburgh 27
H. W. Green, Pittsburgh 4 _LG ::
-...... CJL .:-.::.
='_;' J.P. W111 rd, AED, New Kensington JMC _,_.
'_F_ File routed to H. Spuhler and E. W. Johnson ....... B_I;........ .i:!
_ _ _ :-
m
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To:
CC:
From:
Subject:
Reference:
HVIS-4153-16
Dr. Michael Bjorkman Boeing 2-H82C JR34
Greg Olsen NASA-MSFC
Eric Christiansen NASA-JSC
Norman Elfer Martin Marietta MAF 4153
SD_SURF Conclusions
Letter from M. Bjorkman to G. Olsen "Number of Elements Required to
Make a BUMPER Model." 6/22/92 2H82C-GBR-295-92. Attached with
annotations.
Your memo regarding SD_SURF is completely correct regarding how SD_SURF
operates. However, I would like to address the concerns about the conclusions to be
drawn from SD_SURF output and what modifications would be useful.
I did not mean to imply the conclusions attributed me in the two references. In fact, I
meant to completely avoid the subject of specific analyses in both the user's guide and
the AIAA paper, and I apologize for apparently leaving it open to having those
conclusions drawn.
The _wave" issue was not meant to be a criteria for judging an analysis, but rather a
guide for understanding how the ballistic limit surface was being queried by the
GEOMETRY output and the overall effect on PNP. The SD_SURF output shows which
velocities and obliquities influence the overall PNP.
The first conclusion you listed is a misquote. The correct quote from the paper is:
... the analysis of a curved surface in BUMPERII is more accurate [than
SD_SURF] only if the size of the facets is smaller than the five-degree
increments used on the RESPONSE and AREA SURFACE tables.
The missing word was "more," and it was used in relation to SD_SURF. This was only
meant to be a relative comparison between the two programs. The programs will
produce slightly different results that are negligible for the ballistic limit surfaces we
have dealt with. The remark addressed the angle subtended by a facet used to
represent a curved surface. The remark was meant to quantify a situation where the
BUMPERII result would be more accurate, if there was a significant difference in the
results. The point of the statement was that SD_SURF overall probability calculations
may be used as confidently as BUMPERII for models that have coarser increments than
5 ° facets and 90 threat directions, regardless of the ballistic limit surface. Finer models
are prohibitively time consuming and will not necessarily produce a different result.
1
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The second conclusion you mention is that 45 threats are not sufficient to calculate the
overall PNP. I did not say this, and regret that is conclusion could be drawn. For the
current velocity distribution and space station shields, 45 threats is certainly adequate.
What causes errors? Like any computer model that treats a continuous process as a
discrete or finite element, there is a chance of introducing errors. Of course, BUMPERII
and SD_SURF do not require the same level of debugging as a finite element or
hydrocode model. One sources of potential error is in the shadowing and area
calculation, which BUMPERII does quite well. The partial shadowing option is a good
quick way to determine if the discretized environment and geometry affect the effective
area. The second potential source of error is how well the ballistic limit surface is
interrogated. The old meteoroid method of using the average impact velocity is
certainly inappropriate for space debris.
Your enclosures 4 and 5 give the false impression that BUMPERII averages over the
the entire velocity range associated with each threat. In actual fact BUMPERII uses
only a single velocity for each threat as shown in your enclosure 3. BUMPERII does not
know what happens to the ballistic limit surface between each calculated threat
velocity.
If the ballistic limit surface is smoothly varying there is potentially a small error
introduced by lumping all of the exposed area of a curved surface into one flat facet and
the debris angular distribution into a discreet number of threats. Each velocity and
facet treats all of the exposed area as if it occurs at one velocity and obliquity. This is
a relatively small error, the magnitude of which depends on the curvature of the
ballistic limit surface.
However, if the velocity and obliquity increments are large, and the ballistic limit
surface has deep troughs or sharp peaks, then a larger error is possible. It is possible to
miss key areas. In other terms, the ballistic limit surface can be undersampled. What
matters to the analyst is whether it affects the result. The shape of the ballistic limit
surface has a direct impact on the fidelity of the environment and geometry models
needed to sample it. The SD_SURF output provides the information to judge whether
the cusps in the ballistic limit surface were caught by the model and whether they will
influence the PNP.
Are 45 threats adequate for Space Station models? The answer is definitely "yes"
for the current single bumper with MLI configuration. Reference to the SD_SURF The
PNP is dominated by high velocity penetration resistance, where the ballistic limit
surface is relatively smooth and there are more velocity increments.
However, this is not necessarily true for other ballistic limit surfaces. The PNP for the
multi-shock shield is more sensitive to the low velocity performance. In this case, 45
threat increments may give slightly different results than environment models with
more threats.
Are 15 ° degree facets adequate for Space Station models? The answer is again
"yes" for the current single bumper with MLI configuration, but the facet size is closer
2
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to being critical than the number of threat directions. The environment was modeled
in 4 ° increments but the geometry is in 15 ° increments. Is it acceptable to only sample
the ballistic limit surface at 30 °, 45 ° and 60°? or 38 ° , 53 ° and 68°? This is what
BUMPERII is doing using 15 ° facets. This appears to be adequate for the current shield
design (especially considering our knowledge of obliquity effects at high velocities). The
"waves _ in the obliquities (calculated by GEOMETRY) are not necessarily in sync with a
trough in the ballistic limit surface, so some averaging will occur. More importantly, as
in the previous question, the PNP is dominated by high velocity penetration resistance
where the ballistic limit surface is relatively smooth.
If the trough in multi-shock shields is significant at high velocities and obliquities, then
the probability of one or more penetrations should be sensitive to the angle subtended
by each facet.
As a point of interest, an alternative to building a more refined model for PNP
comparison would be to rotate the geometric elements to watch the impact on PNP.
This can be done using SuperTab and BUMPERII, or using the EXCEL AREA_MAKER
Macro in SD_SURF.
One remark about the conclusion paragraph in your memo: I take it you were referring
to the probability of one or more penetrations (1-PNP) when you stated that "facets
subtending 15 ° angles give mean numbers of impact accurate to within a fraction of a
percent? The number of impacts should be accurate, the question is whether or not the
impacts will penetrate, which of course depends on the velocity and obliquity of impact,
as well as the ballistic limit surface.
How should SD_SURF operate? As SD_SURF is currently structured, it accurately
shows how BUMPERH queries the ballistic limit surface. However, as your memo
drives home, it can be somewhat confusing. It was assumed that the analyst would
have to try grouping velocities and obliquities in several ways (easily done in EXCEL) to
completely understand which velocity and obliquity combinations are most significant to
giving the overall PNP.
There are several approaches to enhancing the utility of SD_SURF but I view them as
enhancements rather that errors in the current implementation.
The first possibility is to lump all of the area of a facet into the closest velocity and
obliquity cell. This smooths out the peaks for a single facet (but there will still be
spurious peaks when different facets are close). This would also introduce unnecessary
error into the overall PNP analysis.
The second possibility will simplify interpretation and still maintain consistency with
BUMPERH. The final results can be rolled up into 1 km/s and 5 ° increments. The
EXCEL AREA_MAKER already takes A_SURF output and puts the areas into 0.5 km/s
increments instead of the 0.25km/s increments used by RESPONSE. This will remove
some of the _waves" in the velocity direction, but not in the obliquity direction, since
they were introduced by 15 ° facets. Your enclosure 4 illustrated the problem of splitting
up the exposure areas in one dimension (velocity). The requirement to split up the area
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in velocity and obliquity will still create some interpretation problems. Due to these
problems, the analyst must still exercise some judgement, so that this change would not
make a significant impact.
Another option is for A_SURF to spread the areas associated with each facet over the
velocity and obliquity range dictated by the number of threats and the facet size used to
mode] curved surfaces. The first number is available from hhe GEOMETRY output,
while the second would have to be entered manually. This would help cure the problem
ofundersampling the ballistic limit surface (just as partial shadowing makes up for a a
coarse geometry model). It should also be noted that this same approach is feasible
with the SHIELD portion of BUMPERII (or BUMPERIII?) For example, a facet with a
38 ° obliquity to a particular threat could be assumed to have areas at 33 °, 38 ° and 43 °
degrees to a given threat direction. (The next level of refinement is to partition the area
according to projected areas based on obliquity.) (This averaging feature should be
selectable by PID or location, since it is inappropriate for a flat surface like a cupola
pane, unless you want to include elliptical orbits into the analysis as well.) Perhaps if
this would be first implemented as an enhancement to BUMPERII, it is more politically
acceptable.
The benefits of these options need to be evaluated by NASA to see if it is worth
continuing the development of SD_SURF in conjunction with, or separately from,
BUMPERII.
If you have additional comments on SD_SURF of if I may be of assistance please call me
at (504)-257-3162. My FAX is (504)-257-4440.
My address is: Norman Elfer
Dept 4153
Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems
P.O. Box 29304
New Orleans, LA 70189
PS. As I mentioned to Greg Olsen, the Macintosh version of BUMPERII may produce
errors. Apparently BUMPERH has sections of code that pass an R*8 variable to a
subroutine that expects an R*4 variable or vice versa. This is not an uncommon
procedure, but the Macintosh will produce an error (using both Language Systems
FORTRAN and Absoft FORTRAN). Could that have caused the apparent conflict
between your enclosure 5 and 6? Something appears to be wrong (at least with the
velocities less than 5 km/s) if enclosure 6 is supposed to be the same as enclosure 5.
Was the environment distribution included with the projected area when making
enclosure 6? - N.E.
4
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June 22, 1992
2H82C-GBR-295-92
To: G. Olsen MSFC/ED-52
cc: R. Abbott JR-34
D. Williams JR-34
Subject:
Reference:
Number of Elements Required to Make a BUMPER Model.
1) N. Effer et al. "Space Debris Surfaces (Computer Code):
Probability of no penetration vs impact velocity and obliquity."
AIAA Space Programs and Technologies Conference, 24-
27 March 1992. AIAA 92-1407.
2) N. Effer, "User's Guide for Space Debris Surfaces
(SD_SURF) FORTRAN Applications and EXCEL Macros
and Spread Sheets." February 1992.
Recently, NASA/MSFC placed Martin-Marietta under contract to, among other things,
write a post-processor for BUMPER (References 1 and 2). Among the conclusions made
from this work were:
. "... the analysis of curved surface in BUMPER II is accurate only if the size
of the facets is smaller than the five degree increments used on the RESPONSE
tables."
2. The default 45 orbital debris threats used by BUMPER are too few.
These conclusions were in part based on the analysis of the effective area of a flat plate
whose normal points is the direction of the y-axis. These SD_SURF results are shown
plotted in Enclosure 1. The objectionable features of these plots are the waves on the
surface labeled "waves" in Enclosure 1. The author of the reference was only able to
smooth out the waves in the SD_SURF plots when the GEOMETRY model of a curved
surface target used facets which subtended an angle of less than 5° (Conclusion 1) and
numbers of threats equal to 68 (Conclusion 2).
The author of the present memo was unaware of ever having seen the waves of References
1 and 2 before. To illustrate this, the problem of Enclosure 1 was calculated and plotted by
the present author in Enclosure 2. Note that there are no waves and the trends are smother
but somewhat similar to those of Enclosure 1.
This discrepancy led to a closer examination of the plotting procedure used in Reference 2.
It was discovered the waves are solely a function of the plotting procedure and are not a
feature of the BUMPER 1/GEOMETRY tables.
GEOMETRY defaults to 45 equally spaced threat approach angles. Since there is a one-to-
one mapping between orbital debris approaching angle and closing velocity, this results in
HVIS Consulting - page 26
HypervelocityImpactStudy- Consulting
unequal spacing of the threats in velocity space, See Enclosure 3 top row of squares. The
3d plotting routine used by EXCEL required evenly spaced intervals of velocity. The
intervals used by SD_SURF are illustrated by the bottom row of squares in Enclosure 3.
Note that for small closing velocities there are many SD_SURF intervals for one
GEOMETRY interval.
The one dimensional analog of the algorithm used by SD_SURF to distribute effective area
belonging to the unequally spaced GEOMETRY intervals over the equally spaced
SD_SURF intervals is illustrated in Enclosure 4. Note that the SD_SURF algorithm
introduces large gaps in the plot by assigning all of GEOMETRY effective area to the
SD_SURF interval nearest the center of the GEOMETRY interval. Thus, if there are many
SD SURF intervals per GEOMETRY interval some of the SD_SURF intervals will never
get an effective area assigned to them. That is, waves on the results will appear. To
illustrate the effect, the effective area calculation for the flat plate of Enclosure 1 and 2 was
plotted in Enclosure 5 using the GEOMETRY intervals. The SD SURF algorithm was
used to replot the data on evenly spaced intervals in Enclosure 6. Note the waves.
In conclusion, the waves are an artifact of SD_SURF and not GEOMETRY. Other studies
have shown that facets subtending 15° angles give mean numbers of impact accurate to
within a fi-action of a percent. The conclusion made in References 1 and 2 that 5° facets are
necessary is solely a consequence of using 5° and 0.25 krn/s intervals in SD_SURF.
2-H82C JR-34
461-5788
,.---77._:--3 ' -'
. i .. jr,.
• _ ¢ , _" '2 7_!, -/
__ _-c_") 2.1
George B. Ranch, Jr.
2-H82C JR-34
461-5755
MDB:am
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ENCLOSURE 1
Area [sq m]
2.50E-02
2.00E-02-
1.50E-02
1.00E-02
Waves
5.00E-03-
o;
Velocity [km/s] ,- "- it3
75
5O
25 Obliquity
[degrees]0
EXAMPLE OF WAVES WHICH APPEAR ON AN SD_SURF PLOT OF
A BUMPER GEOMETRY FILE.
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